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WHO CAN BE AGAINST FAIRNESS?
THE CASE AGAINST THE ARBITRATION
FAIRNESS ACT
Peter B. Rutledge*
At present, Congress is considering the most radical overhaul
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) since its enactment in 1925.1
The main reform vehicle, the Arbitration Fairness Act2 would prohibit most predispute arbitration clauses between companies and
individuals. Instead, in such matters, arbitration could only occur
after the dispute has arisen, that is, through a post-dispute agreement between the parties.
Much like the sirens of Ulysses, the bill’s defenders sing a variety of seemingly irresistible melodies tempting the listener to oppose arbitration: Arbitration surrenders an individual’s right to a
jury trial. Arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts are “mandatory” and therefore give the individual little
choice over whether to accept them. Arbitrators are not independent but, rather, are beholden to the repeat players (i.e., the companies). If arbitration is truly such a good deal, then parties will be
as likely to agree to it after a dispute arises as they would be on a
predispute basis. As the bill’s title suggests, this reform movement
is ultimately about fairness, and who can be against fairness?
Much like Ulysses, though, we must strap ourselves to the
mast of reason and resist such calls. Whatever their allure, they
threaten to wreck a seaworthy ship, just like the sirens’ songs.
Abolishing the system of enforceable pre-dispute agreements, as
proponents of the Arbitration Fairness Act urge, would hardly improve the lot of the average individual. Indeed, in such a world,
individuals might be far worse off, for they would find it far harder
to obtain a lawyer, find the cost of dispute resolution far more expensive, wait far longer to obtain relief and may well never see a
day in court. Nor would a system of post-dispute arbitration somehow miraculously salvage the virtues of arbitration while letting its
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. I
would like to thank Dean Veryl Miles for her generous support of this research through a grant
from the Dean’s Research Fund. This article draws on ideas conveyed during testimony on the
Arbitration Fairness Act that I delivered in October 2007 and December 2007.
1 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
2 Arbitration Fairness Act, S.1782/H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) [Arbitration Fairness Act].
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defects sink to the sea floor. There simply is no empirical evidence
demonstrating the viability of postdispute arbitration.
The stakes, thus, should be clear. If Congress enacts the Arbitration Fairness Act, it effectively will kill arbitration between companies and individuals in this country. While leaving the average
individual worse off, the bill would, with certainty, benefit one
group: Trial lawyers. They would unquestionably find it far easier
to bring certain class action lawsuits in court and thereby hope to
extract quick, easy and lucrative settlements – with high fees for
the lawyers and little coupons for the individuals. A fair system?
Hardly.
This is not to suggest that the system of arbitration in the
United States is flawless, but it has largely worked well. Where
there are flaws, a combination of industry self-regulation and judicial oversight has sought to address those errors. In some cases,
those corrections have been far more prompt and efficacious than
attempts to correct defects in our civil justice system. And in some
matters, the debated issue ultimately turns on an empirical question for which we do not have adequate data to give a definitive
answer. In these cases, the Arbitration Fairness Act puts the cart
before the horse by abolishing arbitration altogether before we adequately understand some of its essential contours.
In this brief essay, I hope to lay out the case against the Arbitration Fairness Act.3 Part I of this Article addresses the “findings”
on which the act is premised. It explains how in several respects
the current research on arbitration flatly contradicts the premises
animating those findings (in other respects, the data is incomplete,
so the “findings” at best are better described as “untested hypotheses” or “assumptions”). Part II of this Article explains why
postdispute arbitration is not a viable alternative to our present
system of enforceable predispute arbitration clauses.
I.

THE FINDINGS

The Arbitration Fairness Act administers harsh medicine. As
already noted, it would declare unenforceable arbitration clauses in
employment, consumer or franchise disputes as well as disputes
3 In doing so, I do not question the motives of its Congressional sponsors. Having had the
opportunity to testify personally before two Congressional subcommittees on the matter, I found
the members to be respectful of and receptive to reasoned argument, even if that argument did
not support their public positions.
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arising under statutes intended to protect civil rights or to regulate
contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining
power.4 Additionally, though the bill is not explicit on the matter,
it apparently is intended to cover disputes in the securities industry
as well.5 These reforms, along other provisions of the bill, would
overturn several of the major Supreme Court precedents in the
field of arbitration.6 Not only is its sweep broad, it also runs deep.
Rather than applying simply to arbitration agreements formed after is effective date, the bill applies to “any dispute or claim that
arises on or after” its date of enactment. Consequently, the bill
invalidates arbitration clauses that may be years old and renders
unenforceable entire systems of arbitration that were designed at a
time when they were fully legal. Consequently, the bill will upset
substantially settled commercial expectations of various companies
and in various industries.7
This jackhammer approach to arbitration reform rests on a series of seven “findings” about the current state of arbitration.
Those findings, found in Section 2 of the bill, reflect a mix of empirical judgments and value judgments. This part of the Article
analyzes those findings and demonstrates how, in several respects,
they are either not supported by, or flatly contradicted by, the empirical record. In the subsections that follow, I reproduce, largely
4 Arbitration Fairness Act supra note 2, at § 4. The bill does not define what statutes qualify as ones “intended to protect civil rights” or “to regulate contracts or transactions between
parties of unequal bargaining power.” While some statutes such as Title VII or the ADEA
probably fall within this definition, interpretive gaps remain. This is particularly true with respect to the second part of the definition. Does RICO “regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power?” If enacted, the Arbitration Fairness Act virtually
guarantees litigation over such interpretive ambiguities.
5 See Statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on the Constitution (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.
cfm?id=3055&wit_id=4083 (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
6 The invalidation of arbitration clauses would certainly overturn the holdings of several
cases. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Orijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987). It also would invalidate the results in a number of other cases which, though not presenting the precise issue of arbitrability, nonetheless involved contracts covered by the act. See, e.g.,
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); GreenTree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Another provision of the bill declares that a court, applying
federal law, shall determine the Act’s applicability the arbitration agreement’s enforceability.
This provision would largely overrule the holding of the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
7 These changes may well raise constitutional concerns, but that issue is beyond the scope of
this article.
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verbatim, the various findings in the FAA and, thereafter, analyze
them.
Finding 1: “The Federal Arbitration Act . . . was intended to
apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar
sophistication and bargaining power.”8
Analysis: This finding really is a statement about the legislative history of the FAA. That legislative history is in fact quite
sparse. Congress held virtually no hearings on the bill and appears
to have based it largely on New York’s successful experience with
its own arbitration law.9 The scant legislative history does contain
some indication that it was designed primarily for inter-company
disputes, but at least one snippet of the history expresses a belief
that the bill will benefit individuals as well.10 At bottom, though,
this finding is not particularly important. Regardless of the actual
intent of Congress in 1925, the current Congress certainly is not
bound by it and is, as a constitutional matter, free to amend the bill
to reflect a different set of commercial realities and norms.
Finding 2:
A series of Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning
of the [FAA] so that it now extends to disputes between parties
of greatly disparate economic power, such as consumer disputes
and employment disputes. As a result, a large and rapidly growing number of corporations are requiring millions of consumers
and employees to give up their right to have disputes resolved
by a judge or jury, and instead submit their claims to binding
arbitration.11

Analysis: This finding breaks down into two subsidiary propositions. The first proposition concerns the growing frequency of
arbitration clauses. While some evidence suggests that arbitration
clauses are on the rise and that arbitration dockets are growing, the
picture is actually far more complex. One recent study of consumer arbitration in over thirty industries found that the frequency
of clauses varied greatly across industries. Approximately thirtythree percent of surveyed companies employed arbitration clauses
- nowhere were they universally used. Industries such as the financial services sector used them 69.2% of the time while other indus8

Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(1).
See Katherine van wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
10 See S. Rep. No. 536 (1924) (noting that the FAA, by avoiding the delay and expense of
litigation, will appeal to, among other groups, individuals).
11 Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(2).
9
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tries such as food and entertainment never used them.12 Another
very recent study of corporate 8-K filings found that companies
used arbitration clauses only about eleven percent of the time; the
precise data again varied with the type of contract (with clauses
more frequent in licensing and employment contracts), but with respect to no category of contracts did companies use arbitration
clauses a majority of the time.13
The second proposition concerns the availability of a jury trial
to those who agree to arbitrate. It is certainly true that arbitration
does not involve a jury. But it bears emphasis that eliminating arbitration would not suddenly cause all of those disputes to be decided by a jury. Numerous studies have documented how most
civil litigation is resolved far before a case ever reaches a jury,
whether through voluntary dismissal, settlement or dispositive rulings by the judge.14 Ironically, in at least one respect, arbitration
enhances the opportunity for a jury to hear an individual’s case.
When an individual resists arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act
grants the individual the right to have a jury decide whether the
individual entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement.15
Finding 3:
Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Few people
realize or understand the importance of the deliberately fine
print that strips them of their rights, and because entire indus12

Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, Volunteering to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004).
13 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:
An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id-1076968. In a similar vein, a somewhat dated
study of arbitration clauses in the securities industry found that clauses were used more frequently for higher-risk accounts. GAO: How Investors Fare at 28 (May 1992). Likewise, a survey of the telecommunications industry published in 2001 found that sixteen percent of firms
surveyed used external arbitration procedures in their employment disputes. See Alexander
Colvin, Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 643 (2001).
14 See Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (2005) (finding a vast majority of cases dismissed
or resolved without court action undermines claim that arbitration will stagnate development of
the law); Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 47 (1998) (cases that never reach a jury – of 3419 employment discrimination cases filed in 1994 that led to definitive judgment, sixty percent were disposed of by pretrial
motion, with employers prevailing in ninety-eight percent of those); Michael Delikat & Morris
Kleiner, Comparing Litigation And Arbitration Of Employment Disputes: Do Claimants Better
Vindicate Their Rights In Litigation?, A.B.A. LITIG. SEC. CONFLICT MGMT. 3, 8 (2003).
15 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2008).
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tries are adopting these clauses, people increasingly have no
choice but to accept them. They must often give up their rights
as a condition of having a job, getting necessary medical care,
buying a car, opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and
the like. Often they are not even aware that they have given up
their rights.16

Analysis: This finding breaks down into three subsidiary propositions. One concerns a positive assumption about people’s
awareness that they are agreeing to arbitrate. I do not know of any
empirical study actually documenting consumer or employee understanding of such matters. For the sake of argument, though, let
us stipulate that this first proposition is accurate. Even if true, that
complaint is not directed at arbitration in particular but, instead, at
form contracts more generally. A form contract may contain a variety of terms, ranging from dispute resolution to liability waivers
to attorney fee shifting, which an individual may not read. At bottom, then, the argument proves too much. If ignorance about a
contract term supplied sufficient reason to override it as a matter
of law, then a large array of contract terms, not simply arbitration
clauses, would be invalid.
The second proposition concerns the frequency with which
companies have adopted arbitration clauses. As noted above, the
actual picture is far more nuanced. The frequency of arbitration
clauses varies across industry and with the type of contract, and the
most recent evidence (the Eisenberg and Miller study)17 suggests
that no single type of contract universally employs arbitration
clauses.
The third proposition concerns the lack of consumer choice.
This proposition could be understood in two ways. It might be understood to be an empirical statement about the pervasiveness of
arbitration clauses in a particular industry (i.e., every credit card
company uses arbitration clauses, so people who want credit cards
“have no choice” but to consent to arbitration). To the extent that
is the intended import, I have already noted how the empirical picture does not support the proposition.
This proposition might also be understood as normative – that
regardless of the pervasiveness of an arbitration clause in a given
industry, individuals are being presented such clauses on a “take it
or leave it” basis, and such contracts of adhesion are inherently
unfair. Like the proposition about ignorance over contract terms,
16
17

Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(3).
Eisenberg, Miller, & Sherwin, supra note 13.
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this proposition is not unique to arbitration. Individuals are
presented with a variety of terms on a “take it or leave it” basis.18
For example, my employer presents me with only a single 401(k)
plan. Similarly, as a consumer, I may be presented with a variety
of “take it or leave it” terms ranging from the interest rate at my
bank to the price of the car that I rent. Companies fix these terms
for a very simple reason – they enable the company to “price” their
goods at a predictable level.19 Imagine the impact on a rental car
company’s bottom line if the parties had to dicker over the price of
every rental. Each transaction would take marginally more time
(meaning longer waits and fewer rentals), and the company may
well lose money if it had to lower the price for certain customers.
Just as there are valid economic reasons why a company is unwilling to dicker over terms in this way, so too may a company justifiably refuse to bargain over its dispute resolution, which likewise
affects its bottom-line and, therefore, the marginal price for its
product.
The normative appeal of this argument admittedly may depend on the nature of the good at issue. For example, we might be
more concerned about the lack of consumer choice over certain
basic goods (like food) than more discretionary ones (like cell
phones). But here it is worth recalling that, as a society, we tolerate a great deal of non-negotiated choice even as to basic goods.
For example, I have no choice as to the type of health insurer offered by my employer. Likewise, people may have little choice
about the price of gasoline even if they attempt to shop for the
lowest one. These are choices that are arguably far more important to the average individual than the choice of forum in which to
resolve their disputes. Thus, while the normative aspect of this
finding is appealing at first blush, it actually appears quite flimsy in
light of the pervasiveness of “take it or leave it” contracts in a variety of settings more important to the average individual.
Finding 4: “Private arbitration companies are sometimes
under great pressure to devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those companies will receive their
lucrative business.”20
Analysis: This finding is really an empirical statement about
the economic incentives of arbitration associations. As with the
18

See Sherwyn et al., supra note 14, at 1563–64.
See, e.g., Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1222 (1983).
20 Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(4).
19
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earlier empirical statement about the pervasiveness of arbitration
clauses, the reality here tells a far more complex picture than the
rhetoric. The empirical record on repeat player effects is decidedly
mixed: some studies have found evidence of a repeat player phenomenon while others have found no demonstrable effect.21 Furthermore, even where the repeat player effect exists, the cause is
not clear. Most research suggests that the repeat player effect – if
it exists – is not due to the arbitrator’s financial incentives but, instead, to the “learning effects” from the repeat player’s experiences.22 That is, the repeat player learns what sorts of cases can be
won and, therefore, is more likely to settle those, leaving for arbitration those where the repeat player is relatively confident it can
win outright. In this respect, the repeat player phenomenon does
not differ substantially from similar phenomena in litigation. Several studies show a high win-rate for companies in litigation – both
in the summary judgment stage and at trial.23 Such results do not
prove that litigation is inherently unfair or biased in favor of the
repeat player (i.e., business); rather, it demonstrates simply that
business make rational economic judgments about which cases to
settle and which to litigate.24
Finding 5:
Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of
public law for civil rights and consumer rights, because there is
no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions. With the
knowledge that their rulings will not be seriously examined by a

21 Compare Lisa Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. ON CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 380
(1995) and Lisa Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323 & Table 2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004), with
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process At Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under
the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 816
(2003).
22 See Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 21, at 323 & Table 2. See also Sherwyn et al., supra
note 14, at, 1570–77; Hill, supra note 21, at 816.
23 See William Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes: Can
Justice Be Served (May 1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Arizona State University) (on file
with author).
24 In formal terms, the company would be willing to settle a case where the costs of litigating
the case to potentially successful completion exceed the minimum amount that an individual is
prepared to accept in settlement.
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court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules.25

Analysis: This finding breaks down into two propositions.
The first proposition is an empirical statement about the diminution of public law. There are two basic problems with this proposition. For one thing, it implicitly depends on another empirical
assumption about the prevalence of arbitration clauses. If all employers utilized arbitration clauses, then that might well reduce the
role of courts in the development of public law.26 For another
thing, the problem again is not unique to arbitration. Settlement
also impedes the development of public law; like arbitration, it deprives courts of the opportunity to render a decision in a dispute.27
Moreover, for those cases that are tried, only a small fraction actually make public law – those that result in published decisions of
federal appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court.
District court decisions of course have no binding precedential
value, and many, indeed most, appellate cases are affirmed through
unpublished per curiam decisions that, as a formal matter, have no
precedential value.28
The second proposition also is an empirical statement about
arbitrators’ decisionmaking methods. It is indeed true that courts
generally conduct only limited review of the merits of an arbitrator’s decision (broadly speaking, their review is limited to manifest
disregard of the law).29 Indeed, that lack of judicial intervention is
one of the great benefits of arbitration.30 Yet the lack of judicial
oversight does not necessarily mean that the arbitrator will refuse
to apply the governing legal rule. Indeed, as I have explained elsewhere, arbitrators may have very compelling incentives to develop
reputations for getting the law right.31 As an empirical matter,
moreover, we do not have very good data on whether arbitrators
are systematically failing to apply the governing legal rule or, per25

Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(5).
Of course, courts would retain a role to the extent they reviewed the award for manifest
disregard of the law. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
27 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
28 See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2003).
29 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); First Options, 514 U.S. 938; Hall St. Assoc. v.
Mattel, Inc., 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
30 See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS:
DRAFTING AND ENFORCING (Aspen Publishers 2006).
31 Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV.
151 (2004).
26
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haps more importantly, are inferior to juries in their ability to apply the rules.32 Thus, at best, this finding remains in the realm of
untested empirical proposition.
Finding 6: “Mandatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights and consumer rights because it is not transparent. While the American civil justice system features publicly
accountable decision makers who generally issue written decision
that are widely available to the public, arbitration offers none of
these features.”33
Analysis: This finding consists of both an empirical proposition and a normative one. The empirical proposition is a statement
about the relative transparency of arbitration compared to litigation. The complaint about arbitration is overblown, for in several
respects arbitration is not entirely shrouded in secrecy. Parties to
arbitration are not bound to any confidentiality obligation; rather,
under most arbitral rules, the confidentiality obligation extends to
the administering institution and the arbitrators. It precludes them
from divulging details about the arbitration, absent approval by the
parties.34 Moreover, any arbitration is potentially subject to public
scrutiny during at least two junctures in the process: litigation over
the enforcement of the agreement and litigation over the enforcement of the award.35 And of course the litigation system is not
always bathed in sunshine – protective orders, closed proceedings,
filings under seal, and settlements all reduce the degree of public
scrutiny of the system.
The normative proposition is that the lack of transparency is
an inherently bad quality. This complaint also overlooks the benefits of less public disputes. Confidential proceedings reduce the
32 Data comparing outcomes between jury verdicts and arbitrator awards is mixed. Compare
Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators and Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 261 (2003) (finding no significant difference between jury verdicts and arbitrator awards except that juries are more willing to “empty corporate deep pockets”), with Neil
Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Non-Economic Damages, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 901
(1993) (finding no significant differences between jury verdicts and arbitrator awards in hypothetical cases and noting certain categories in which arbitrator’s award was more generous than
jury verdict).
33 Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(6).
34 See, e.g., National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure Rule 4, available at http://www.
arb-forum.com/main.aspx?itemID=330&hideBar=False&nayID=183&nows=3; JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures Rule 26(a), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/
images/PDF/JAMS-comprehensive_arbitration_rules.PDF; American Arbitration Association
Consumer Due Process Protocol Principle 12(b), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=
22019.
35 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4, 10 (2000).

\\server05\productn\C\CAC\9-2\CAC212.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 11

13-MAY-08

ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT

7:27

277

risk that parties may become “dug in” through public position taking. Moreover, confidential proceedings may spare both parties
embarrassing revelations that a public proceeding would disclose.
Thus, at a normative level, the virtues of confidentiality at least
counterbalance some of the loss of transparency.
Finding 7:
“Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of substantive statutory
rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their
claims hundreds of miles from their homes.”36

Analysis: This finding functions as an empirical proposition
about the pervasiveness of certain terms in arbitral clauses. While
we do not have extensive research about the terms of arbitral
clauses, the best available research suggests that their terms are not
as “deliberately tilt[ed]” as the Arbitration Fairness Act would suggest. For example, a 2004 study of consumer arbitration clauses by
Demaine and Hensler found that only 30.8% prohibited class actions.37 As to the situs, fifty percent of the clauses they surveyed
specified the situs of the arbitration, and in all but three cases was
the specified situs near the individual’s residence or place of service.38 This led the authors to conclude that “[f]ew of the [fiftytwo] clauses reflect the type of egregious self-dealing that has been
identified in publicized cases. Most of the clauses appear in many
respects to put consumers on equal terms with the businesses that
drafted them . . . .”39
At a more general level, there is no particular reason to believe that arbitration is “deliberately tilted” against the individual.
As I explained elsewhere, most aggregate studies on arbitration
suggest precisely the opposite proposition. By most measures, individuals achieve superior, or at least comparable, results in arbitration compared to litigation.40
In sum, the findings that underpin the most radical overhaul of
federal arbitration law in over eighty years are scientifically unproven, normatively debatable or demonstrably wrong. Instead,
arbitration has in important respects improved access to justice for
36
37
38
39
40

2008).

Arbitration Fairness Act, supra note 2, at § 2(7).
See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 12, at 72.
Id.
Id. at 72.
See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming
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the average individual: it has lowered the cost of dispute resolution, it has delivered superior, or at least comparable, outcomes for
individuals, and it has done so at a far faster pace than our sluggish
system of civil litigation.41
At this point in the argument, defenders of the Arbitration
Fairness Act have a seductive retort. If arbitration is such a good
deal, then surely parties will be just as likely to agree to it on a
postdispute basis. Postdispute arbitration will capture all the benefits of arbitration while enabling the individual to make a more
fully informed choice about whether to waive their jury right
before they even have a claim. The next section of this Essay turns
to that argument.

II.

POSTDISPUTE ARBITRATION

Defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act are fond of saying
that they do not oppose arbitration. Indeed, they recognize its
many advantages. Rather, they simply object to forcing individuals
to ceding their rights on a predispute basis in adhesion contracts.
Postdispute arbitration remains available under the Act, thereby
retaining the benefits of arbitration while shedding its nefarious
elements.
This argument suffers from two main flaws. First, it is analytically unsound. It ignores the differences in the parties’ incentives
during the predispute and postdispute phases of their relationship.
Second, it ignores the empirical evidence demonstrating the unworkability of postdispute arbitration. This section of the article
explains these flaws.
At the analytic level, parties’ incentives differ in the postdispute setting because they have relatively more information about
the likely contours of the dispute. This superior information enables them to make more strategic calculations about which form
of dispute resolution better advances their interests (or more effectively hinders the individual’s interests). If a company knows that
an individual’s claim is below a certain amount, it may calculate
that the individual could have difficulty obtaining a counsel willing
to represent her. In those cases, a company may be less likely to

41

Id.
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agree to arbitration precisely because it knows that, effectively, its
holdout will prevent the individual from pursuing her claim.42
Now contrast this state of affairs with those in the predispute
context. In this setting, neither the company nor the individual
knows in advance the terms or nature of a dispute.43 Yet each has
an incentive to enter into arbitration – from the individual’s perspective, arbitration provides an affordable forum with superior
chances for obtaining a favorable result; from the company’s perspective, arbitration can lower the company’s litigation costs.
To be sure, parties to predispute arbitration agreements are
engaging in some tradeoffs – the individual may be trading greater
forum accessibility off against higher recoveries in litigation (assuming, of course, she can find a lawyer willing to take her case);
the company is trading lower litigation costs off against a reduced
likelihood of prevailing in the dispute. But that is the nature of any
contractual bargain. The comparative advantage of arbitration is
that it enables both parties to enter into an arrangement to manage
some of the ex ante uncertainties about disputes before they arise,
a possibility that is lost once the dispute arises and its terms are
better known.44
Experience under the recently enacted ban on predispute arbitration clauses in automobile dealer agreements demonstrates how
superior information about the dispute may affect the willingness
to arbitrate. In 2002, Congress amended the FAA and, for the first
time since the FAA’s enactment, explicitly banned predispute arbitration in a category of cases. The stated purpose of the law was to
level the playing field between automobile manufacturers and their
dealers (while leaving open the possibility of postdispute arbitration).45 Yet, in a recent case from the Seventh Circuit, an automobile dealer actually sought to compel arbitration, and the
manufacturer successfully resisted it with respect to part of their
dispute – effectively forcing the dealer to resolve the dispute in
multiple forums.46 Had the parties been able simply to enter into a
predispute arbitration agreement, such strategic behavior likely
never would have arisen.
42

See Maltby, supra note 14, at 58.
They may be able to predict a likely dispute to a degree. They could base these predictions on their past experiences and the nature of the relationship between the parties.
44 See Lewis Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 317 (2003).
45 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2008).
46 Volkswagen Of America, Inc. v. Sud’s Of Peoria, Inc., 474 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2007).
43
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At the empirical level, a variety of empirical measures suggest
that postdispute arbitration will not work. A recent survey of lawyers indicated that an overwhelming majority of them would advise
their clients not to agree to postdispute arbitration.47 Utilization
rates tell a similar story, a recent study of AAA employment arbitrations by Lewis Maltby found that only 6.9% were post dispute in
2001 and a mere 2.6% were postdispute in 2002.48
Of course, one should view these statistics with some hesitation. Declining utilization rates of postdispute arbitration do not
necessarily show that postdispute arbitration would not be used if
it were the only option. An equally valid hypothesis might also be
that, as employers increasingly use predispute clauses, the frequency of postdispute arbitration will decline. Other research,
however, suggests that the infrequency of postdispute arbitration is
more attributable to its structural defects.49 In his study of postdispute arbitration, David Sherwyn investigated the Illinois Human
Rights Commission, a public agency that offered postdispute arbitration of claims falling within its jurisdiction. Sherwyn found that
virtually no one utilized the postdispute option. While the topic of
Sherwyn’s study is admittedly specialized, it does lend credence to
the statistics suggesting that parties will not utilize postdispute
arbitration.

CONCLUSION
At bottom, the Arbitration Fairness Act, while perhaps well
intentioned, does not live up to its name. Its call for a radical overhaul of federal arbitration law rests on a series of empirical and
normative premises that largely do not withstand close scrutiny. Its
“we can have our cake and eat it too” defense of postdispute arbitration simply ignores the analytical and empirical realities of dispute resolution.
47 David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs
Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24
BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 57 (2000). A slightly more dated GAO study found that most
employers likewise do not use postdispute arbitration. GAO, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Employer’s Experiences with ADR in the Workplace 2 (1997).
48 See Maltby, supra note 44, at 319.
49 These would include the greater opportunity for strategic behavior (described above) and
perhaps too the fact that, once a dispute has arisen, the parties are more “dug in” to their positions and may be less willing to enter into any accommodation with their opposing party.
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My opposition is not to suggest that the arbitration system is
flawless. Indeed, in one respect, the defenders of the Arbitration
Fairness Act should be commended. They have drawn attention to
the need for more thorough empirical research into the dynamics
of arbitration specifically and the resolution of disputes more generally. We all can rally around the common mantra that we all
want a system providing just outcomes at a fast pace and at a low
cost. Far harder is it to agree on the contours of that system.
Based on the present state of knowledge, however, the Arbitration
Fairness Act does not provide it.
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